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the era of the sustainable development
goals: a qualitative analysis of food industry
framing in WHO consultations
Kathrin Lauber1,2* , Rob Ralston3, Mélissa Mialon4, Angela Carriedo5 and Anna B. Gilmore1,2Abstract
Background: The UN system’s shift towards multistakeholder governance, now embedded in the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), invites a broad range of actors, including the private sector, to the policymaking table.
Although the tobacco industry is formally excluded from engagement, this approach provides opportunities for
other unhealthy commodity industries to influence the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) non-communicable
disease (NCD) agenda. Focusing on the food industry, this research maps which actors engaged with WHO
consultations, and critically examines actors’ policy and governance preferences as well as the framing they employ
to promote these preferences in the global context.
Methods: All written responses from food industry actors to publicly available NCD-relevant WHO consultations
held between September 2015 and September 2018 were identified, totalling forty-five responses across five
consultations. A qualitative frame analysis was conducted to identify policy positions expressed by respondents, as
well as arguments and frames used to do so.
Results: Though no individual companies responded to the consultations, the majority of participating business
associations had some of the largest multinational food corporations as members. Respondents overarchingly
promoted non-statutory approaches and opposed statutory regulation and conflict of interest safeguards. To this
purpose, they framed the food industry as a legitimate and necessary partner in policymaking, differentiating
themselves from the tobacco industry and referencing a history of successful collaboration, while also invoking
multistakeholder norms and good governance principles to portray collaboration as required. Respondents
contrasted this with the limits of WHO’s mandate, portraying it as out of step with the SDGs and framing NCD
decision-making as a matter of national sovereignty.
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Conclusion: We observed that the UN’s call for partnerships to support the SDGs is invoked to defend corporate
access to NCD policy. This highlights the need for more cautious approaches which are mindful of the commercial
determinants of health. Systematic opposition to regulation and to governance approaches which may
compromise commercial actors’ insider role in global health by food industry actors shown here, and the strategic
use of the Sustainable Development agenda to this purpose, raises questions about the value of collaboration from
the perspective of international health agencies such as WHO.
Keywords: Commercial determinants of health, Non-communicable diseases, Corporate political activity, Global
health governance, Food industryIntroduction
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) have become the
leading cause of global morbidity and mortality, causing
over 73% of deaths in 2017 [1]. Unhealthy diets are a
major driver of NCDs [2] and the proliferation of ultra-
processed food and beverage products (‘ultra-processed
foods’ hereafter) [3] plays a key role in this epidemic [4–7].
Ultra-processed foods are highly profitable, and predomin-
antly produced and marketed by transnational corporations
[8]. Attempts to introduce policies aimed at decreasing the
consumption of ultra-processed foods have encountered
strong pushback from these corporations (summarised
under ‘food industry’ for simplicity) [9–15]. The WHO has
published a range of recommendations and strategies which
address dietary NCD policy. With an initial focus on
individual-level, or downstream recommendations such as
the majority of the 2004 Global Strategy on Diet, Physical
Activity and Health [16], these have gradually incorporated
population-level, or upstream approaches, for example in
the Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of
NCDs 2013–2020 [17]. Nonetheless, prominent political
documents such as Time to Deliver [18] have stopped
short of recommending fiscal measures [19]. Within
global health governance, such soft regulation fulfils an
important normative role [20], particularly in the
absence of legally binding mechanisms. Therefore,
despite being non-binding in the dietary NCD space,
WHO guidance has prompted a major industry response,
as illustrated by the Sugar Association’s aggressive
counter-campaign to the 2004 proposal to limit free sugar
intake to under 10 % of daily caloric intake [21].
Overall, growing evidence that the political activity
of unhealthy commodity industry actors poses a major
barrier to addressing NCDs has led to calls for clear,
transparent, and accountable governance mechanisms
to safeguard policymaking from corporate influence
[2, 22, 23]. Yet, global health governance, traditionally
constrained to “institutions and processes of govern-
ance which are related to an explicit health mandate,”
[24] has seen an increasing move towards more networked
[25] governance which involves non-governmental actors
such as civil society and the private sector [26]. With theexception of the tobacco industry, which has been formally
excluded from participation in public health policymaking
through Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control (FCTC) [27], the multistakeholder
governance model actively invites private sector actors to
participate [28–30]. While the beginning of this
partnership-oriented era pre-dates the year 2000 [31], it
was formalised with the introduction in 2015 of the UN
SDGs [32], specifically SDG 17 which calls on member
states to “[e]ncourage and promote effective pubic, public-
private and civil society partnerships” [32]. However, there
are concerns that there may be an inherent conflict
between SDG 17 and SDG 3, which includes a target to
reduce premature mortality from NCDs by one-third [32],
by lending legitimacy to partnerships with the private sector
without acknowledging the well-established notion that
these can undermine public health goals when they involve
industries dependent upon the sale of unhealthy commod-
ities [33, 34].
Public health policy and governance are not deter-
mined purely by the translation of scientific evidence
through value- and interest-free analysis: central ques-
tions of authority and power highlight their inherently
political nature [35]. Drawing on the notion that such
power may be employed in instrumental or discursive
ways, meaning it can be exerted through actions or argu-
ments [36], this study focuses primarily on the latter.
We aim to gain insights into how food industry actors
attempt to shape debates around NCDs at the global
level, using submissions to WHO consultations on NCD
policy and governance held after the adoption of the
SDGs. In so doing, it addresses a key gap in the litera-
ture on food industry influence which hitherto has fo-
cused on sub-national [37, 38] and national [9–14] levels
of governance, with the global level neglected. Specific-
ally, we address three key questions:
1. Which food industry actors participated in recent
WHO consultations on NCD policy and governance?
2. What are their positions on policy and governance
tools?
3. How are these positions justified?
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constructivist view of framing which is rooted in the
notion that there are multiple ways we can make sense
of the social world [39]. Policy actors may understand an
issue in differing ways, with frames as “structures of
belief, perception and appreciation” underlying distinct
policy positions [40]. Policy frames, described as
“weapons of advocacy” [41], have the potential to shape
policy processes and outcomes [42]. Framing an issue
and its solutions in a certain way provides an “ordering
logic” [43] and allows actors to set the terms of the de-
bate and legitimise certain solutions while precluding
others [42–44]. This has implications not only for how
these matters are addressed, but may also affect govern-
ance structures by defining who is, and who is not, a
legitimate stakeholder [44, 45].
Methods
Data sources
We undertook a two-step process to identify food indus-
try submissions to relevant WHO consultations on NCD
policy and governance. First, in January 2019, we sys-
tematically searched the WHO website for consultations
which met the following criteria: (a) they were global in
scope, (b) covered diet-related NCD policy and/or gov-
ernance, (c) responses were published in full on the
WHO website, and (d) they were held in the three-year
window after the SDGs were ratified (September 2015–
September 2018). Second, we identified submissions
representing food industry interests by first selecting all
private sector responses (separate from public sector,
academia, and civil society; categorised as such by WHO
in all but one consultation) and then, from these, select-
ing responses made directly by a food corporation or a
business association (BA) overtly representing food in-
dustry interests (see Table 1 below for definitions). BA
submissions were only included if the organisation expli-
citly stated that they represented the food industry, orTable 1 Definitions
Food industry: Food corporations and their representative bodies. This
includes corporations manufacturing foods and soft drinks (focus on
ultra-processed foods but not exclusive), or forming a key part of their
supply chain, and holding a financial interest in the sale of foods and
soft drinks, including ingredient supply and processing, retail, and fast
food restaurant organisations.
Business association (BA): A not-for profit entity which represents the
interests of its members which are commercial enterprises and/or
national or other business associations.
Cross-industry BA: A business association representing a range of
industries, often with a national or regional focus (e.g. US Council for
International Business).
Food industry BA: A business association which, according to its
own information, predominantly represents the food industry (see
above for definitions). Sub-classified as food, beverage, retail, or
supply chain where specified.parts of it, in their consultation submission. We did con-
sider the inclusion of BAs with food industry members
who did not explicitly mention this but decided against
it as their responses did not address dietary NCDs
sufficiently. No submissions were excluded based on
language as all were either in English or Spanish.
Analysis
Submitting organisations
BAs were classified as either food industry BAs or cross-
industry BAs (see Table 1 for definitions). To gain an
insight into the companies represented by the included
BAs, and given our time constraints, we searched BAs’
websites to identify which of the four largest ultra-
processed food corporations were members (using global
packaged food and soft drinks market shares as a proxy
[46, 47]): Coca-Cola, Mondelez, PepsiCo, and Nestlé.
We used the most recent membership information as of
March 2020. Where previous membership lists were
available, changes during the study timeframe (starting
September 2015) were noted. A list of all organisations
in our sample with membership details can be found in
Additional file 1.
Policy positions and frames
Policy positions After initial familiarisation with the
data, the lead author (KL) identified the positions taken
by each submitting organisation on a range of issues (the
coding framework can be found in Additional file 2).
They were coded in an Excel spreadsheet for whether a
specific policy (e.g. taxation, advertising restrictions) or
governance tool (e.g. conflict of interest (COI) safeguards,
business impact assessments) was discussed and, if so,
whether the organisation supported or opposed it.
Frames We conducted a frame analysis [39, 43] to
explore food industry attempts to shape the discourse
around NCDs in support of their policy positions and
preferred governance approaches. Upon reading of a set
of sample documents from each consultation, members
of the research team (KL, RR, MM) agreed on an initial
list of relevant frames as overarching categories. This list
was refined and added to throughout the iterative ana-
lytical process. Arguments were coded inductively as the
smallest unit of analysis and grouped under overarching
frames. KL coded all submissions in English (n = 36)
and AC coded those in Spanish (n = 7). Moreover, 20
% of the consultation submissions were double-coded
by a second member of the research team (AC) and
discussions with the wider team followed to reach
agreement on the findings (agreement was not quanti-
fied) and to refine them. This analysis was conducted
using NVivo 12 [48].
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Sample
Five relevant consultations were identified (see Table 2),
attracting a total of 437 submissions, 20.8% (91) thereof
from private sector actors and 10.3% (45) explicitly
representing the food industry (Table 2). These forty-
five submissions comprise our sample. The remaining
private sector responses included submissions from
other unhealthy commodity industries (e.g. alcohol), a
range of other commercial actors, and think-tanks. Of
the included consultations, four focused on providing
NCD policy recommendations, including but not limited
to dietary interventions, and the fifth focused on devel-
oping a tool to help Member States manage COI. Of the
five consultations, the WHO Independent High-level
Commission on NCDs was the largest in terms of
responses and the Zero Draft Shanghai Declaration on
Health Promotion the smallest. One submission by
Alimentos y Bebidas de Chile (AB Chile) [49] wasTable 2 Included WHO consultations and a breakdown of total resp
beverage submissions included within these
Consultation title Dates Details
Web-based consultation of the WHO
Independent High-level Commission
on NCDs
10–16 May 2018 Held following a
March 2018 [51]
Independent Hig
report to the UN
NCDs in Septem
to deliver [18]
Consultation on the Member State-led
draft outcome document for WHO
Global Conference on NCDs
(Montevideo Roadmap)
11–25 August 2017 Consultation link
Conference on e
coherence to pr
October 2017. O
Roadmap 2018–2
sustainable devel
Safeguarding against possible conflicts
of interest in nutrition programmes
11–29 September
2017
Consultation on
prevention and
the policy devel
implementation
at country level,
consultation [53
against possible
nutrition program
Updating Appendix 3 of the WHO
Global NCD Action Plan 2013–2020
25 July–1
September 2016
As requested at
3 of the WHO G
2013–2020, a me
cost-effective int
prevention and
formed the basis
Zero draft Shanghai Declaration on
Health Promotion
20 May–15
October 2016
Consultation on
9th Global Confe
Promotion in No
to position healt
fundamental to
Outcome: Shang
promoting health
Sustainable Deve
Total numbersexcluded from the qualitative analysis as it only
contained the draft consultation document without com-
ments [49]. Another submission by the US Council for
International Business (USCIB) [50] merely expressed
support for another organisation’s statement and was
therefore interpreted as identical.
Submitting food industry organisations
No individual food companies submitted responses to
any of the consultations; all twenty-two food industry
actors represented across the forty-five submissions were
BAs. Nineteen specifically represented food and/or
beverage companies, and three were cross-industry BAs
representing a range of sectors including food compan-
ies. Figure 1 below shows that, through these BAs, some
of the largest multinational food corporations were
represented multiple times in every consultation in our
sample. The vast majority of BAs had at least one of the
four selected food corporations as members. As aonses showing private sector submissions and the overt food/
Total number
of responses
Private sector
responses
Responses
representing
food industry
technical consultation in
to inform the WHO
h-level Commission’s
High-Level Meeting on
ber 2018. Outcome: Time
215 47 19
ed to the WHO Global
nhancing policy
event and control NCDs in
utcome: Montevideo
030 on NCDs as a
opment priority [52]
97 17 8
an approach for the
management of COI in
opment and
of nutrition programmes
following a technical
]. Outcome: Safeguarding
conflicts of interest in
mes [54].
44 14 12
the 69th WHA, Appendix
lobal NCD Action Plan
nu of policy options and
erventions for NCD
control, was updated. This
of the WHO Best Buys [55].
64 9 4
a draft considered at the
rence on Health
vember 2016 which aimed
h promotion as
Sustainable Development.
hai Declaration on
in the 2030 Agenda for
lopment [56].
17 4 2
437 91 (20.8%) 45 (10.3%)
Fig. 1 Food industry business associations and their membership links to the four largest, multinational ultra-processed food corporations. This
figure shows food industry BAs who participated in the included consultations and their links to the four largest packaged food and soft drinks
corporations (based on Euromonitor data for packaged food [46] and soft drinks [47]). Dashed lines between companies and BAs indicate an
indirect link through a member organisation (* = ‘umbrella’ BA without direct corporate members). † indicates that a company was a member for
at least part of the study period (Sept 2015 – Sept 2018) but has since left. More information in Additional file 1. This visualisation was created
using PowerPoint [58]
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BAs rather than individual corporations, we also traced
such indirect links (dashed lines in Fig. 1). The Inter-
national Food and Beverage Alliance (IFBA) was the only
BA to respond to all consultations, followed by a group of
similarly active BAs which responded to four out of the five
consultations identified: the International Council of
Beverages Associations (ICBA), the Grocery Manufacturers
Association (GMA, now Consumer Brands Association
[57]), USCIB, and Food Industry Asia (FIA).
Positions on NCD policy and preferred governance
approaches
Though expressing supporting for public health aims,
food industry respondents did not support the idea of
introducing new policies where they took a position on
regulatory interventions such as taxation, marketing re-
strictions, or mandatory labelling, with sugar-sweetened
beverage (SSB) taxation receiving the staunchest oppos-
ition. Instead, respondents expressed support for existing
policies or alternative approaches such as education and
self- or co-regulation of advertising and labelling, in
particular positioning voluntary reformulation as key to
tackling NCDs. In the context of proposed regulation,several respondents advocated for strong consider-
ation of cost to businesses when assessing policies,
with two explicitly calling for business impact assess-
ments [59, 60]. The latter have raised concern in
public health circles for identifying a clear role for
industry and its evidence in policymaking [61]. Every
single organisation supported a multistakeholder gov-
ernance approach, with four respondents additionally
calling for the private sector to be included in WHO’s
reporting on NCD progress. Moreover, COI safe-
guards proposed in the ‘safeguarding against possible
COI in nutrition’ consultation were opposed consist-
ently by the food industry (summary positions for each
policy can be found in Additional file 3).
Not only did food industry respondents express similar
policy positions but several submissions contained
sections which were identical apart from minor edits.
Substantial overlap between submissions of the following
BAs was noted: 1.) GMA [62] and USCIB [63], 2.) Feder-
alimentare [64] and the UN Committee on World Food
Security’s Private Sector Mechanism (PSM-CFS) [65], 3.)
FIA [66] and IFBA [67], 4.) Global Dairy Platform (GDP)
[68] and International Dairy Federation (IDF) [69], and
5.) FoodDrinkEurope [70] and ICBA [71].
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In exploring how the policy positions and preferred
governance approaches above were justified, we identi-
fied seven key frames (Table 3). The interlinking frames
and arguments are mutually supportive and promote the
positions on interventions and preferred governance
approaches discussed above. Maintaining the food indus-
try’s reputation as a necessary and legitimate actor in
public health emerged as an overarching ambition dis-
tinguishable across actors and consultations.
Complexity The complex nature of obesity and related
NCDs was invoked to dismiss regulatory approaches as
too simplistic. The German Food Federation (BLL), forTable 3 Policy and governance frames and arguments. The ‘NCD in
done to tackle NCDs. For simplicity, NCD interventions were groupe
regulation (SR/CR). The former comprises regulatory interventions su
labelling. The latter comprises non-statutory or voluntary initiatives a
governance’ encompasses issues pertaining to how decisions are m
example, broader questions about the role of industry in policymaki
Key arguments in
FRAME NCD interventions B
Complexity Regulation is too simplistic for the complex
issue of NCDs
T
Regulatory redundancy Enough regulation is already in place C
Industry is already regulating itself
NCDs can be sufficiently addressed through
non-statutory interventions
Partnership Successful past collaboration justifies a
partnership approach to NCD policy
In
In
in
Unintended
consequences
Regulation may not have the intended health
benefit (or may be counterproductive)
R
th
Regulation may have unanticipated negative
consequences
Evidence There is insufficient (good) evidence in support
of regulation
In
The existing evidence does not support
regulation
E
a
Good Governance G
A
a
Limited WHO
mandate
W
R
m
N
example, expressed the view that “regulatory measures
like marketing restrictions are not suitable to solve the
complex issue of NCDs” [72]. Diet was framed as too
complex for the regulation of specific products such as
SSBs to be effective or appropriate, drawing attention to
non-dietary factors such as a lack of physical activity.
Promoting a “holistic” [73–77] approach to dietary pub-
lic health policy instead, such arguments were employed
to make the case that all products, including those
considered unhealthy, play a role in people’s diets. This
placed the blame for unhealthy diets as well as the
responsibility for a “balanced” [73, 78, 79] lifestyle on
the individual, justifying the food industry’s promotion
of individual- rather than population-level interventions.terventions’ category refers to arguments about what should be
d into two categories: (a) regulation and (b) self- and co-
ch as taxation, marketing restrictions and bans, and mandatory
nd public-private partnerships to address NCDs. ‘Broader
ade, who governs, and who is governed. This includes, for
ng
the context of:
roader governance
he complexity of NCDs necessitates collaboration with industry
onflict of interest is sufficiently managed (through FENSA)
dustry is a necessary partner in addressing NCDs
dustry is a legitimate actor
NCD policy
Food industry is different to
tobacco (or alcohol) industry
Food industry is an important stakeholder
Risk of engagement does not justify
exclusion
estricting industry engagement in policymaking risks undermining
e fight against NCDs
dustry supports evidence-based policymaking
vidence-based policymaking requires the inclusion of all
vailable evidence (including from industry)
ood governance requires working with industry
chieving policy coherence requires private sector input and
lignment of health with economic agendas
HO is overstepping its mandate
estricting industry engagement is incoherent with the
ultistakeholder approach (and the SDGs)
ational sovereignty National governments hold the primary
responsibility for addressing NCDs
Policy may infringe on national sovereignty
Policy may be incoherent with national
legal obligations
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into the narrative of partnership approaches as the way
forward, USCIB, for example, claims that “[g]iven the
complex nature of nutrition and health, making progress
on NCDs will require partnerships to be formed between
policymakers and non-state actors with lines of commu-
nication remaining open” [63].
Regulatory redundancy In opposing regulatory ap-
proaches, respondents framed regulation as inappropri-
ate or unnecessary by arguing that existing (regulatory
or other) measures were sufficient, the current voluntary
actions have achieved positive results; and where an
intervention was necessary, non-statutory, self- or co-
regulation would be preferable or should at least have
“its place in the policy mix” [80]. FIA and IFBA, for
example, highlight self-regulation as “cost-effective”,
“measurable”, “flexible”, and able to “quickly respond to
societal concerns” [81, 82]. The legitimacy of non-statutory
approaches was emphasised by invoking WHO’s previous
guidance, with FIA for example pointing out that “self-
regulation has formally been recognised as a means of
implementing the policy objective of reducing the impact
on children of the marketing of foods high in fat, sugar and
salt in the 2010 WHO recommendations” [60, 81]. Further
marketing restrictions were also opposed by one German
[72, 83] and one Brazilian [84] respondent on the basis that
sufficient regulation was already in place at country
level. In a similar vein, a frequent argument against
COI safeguards maintained that sufficient protections
existed, often directly invoking the WHO’s Framework
of Engagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA, [85])
[64–66], even though the proposed safeguards focused
on member state management of COI whereas FENSA
is an internal WHO guide [53].
Partnership Respondents employed a partnership
framing to convey a need for industry participation to
adequately tackle NCDs and maintain that food industry
actors have a right to participate. Portraying themselves
as a part of the solution, food industry actors invoked
the urgency of collaboration in order to tackle the NCD
challenge. Highlighting the imbalance between available
and required public resources to prevent and treat
NCDs, respondents argued that the food industry is
needed to fill such gaps: “Given the importance of
tackling NCDs and the limited technical expertise and
resources available in many countries, public-private
engagement will be extremely important to better
address the challenges of NCDs” [86].
A partnership framing and the use of language around
‘multistakeholder’ and ‘multisectoral’ approaches were
also used to position the food industry as a legitimate
policy actor with the right to participate. The idea of ashared purpose between industry and the public sector
was employed to paint a picture of the industry as a
partner, rather than an opponent or a bystander, in NCD
policy. To highlight the food industry as a vital stake-
holder, respondents emphasised its economic importance
[59, 63, 87] and positioned it as a bridge between govern-
ment and consumers, arguing that “businesses in the food
sector have the closest direct relationships with consumers
through their day to day food and diet choices” [88].
Ostensibly successful previous collaboration with govern-
ments and international organisations, as well as ongoing
voluntary commitments, were cited to demonstrate that
the food industry deserves a strong role going forward.
Invoking the food industry’s “long and successful history
of engaging on nutrition and health issues at national,
regional, and global levels”, GMA added that “key public
health initiatives, such as the development of salt reduc-
tion strategies, could not have been achieved without con-
structive engagement between health authorities and our
industry” [59]. Respondents also explicitly differentiated
the food industry from other sectors whose products are
perceived as more harmful, such as alcohol and tobacco.
In particular, food industry actors heavily protested any
comparison or association with the widely denormalised
tobacco industry, considering it “inappropriate for the
WHO to compare the food and beverage industry to
industries excluded from engagement with the WHO”
[64, 65]. In a similar vein, respondents opposed the use of
the term ‘health-harming’ on the basis that it would
inappropriately equate their products with alcohol and
tobacco. One respondent stated that although “high-fat,
sugar and salt products should be consumed in a balanced
manner, it would not be appropriate to classify such
products as “health-harming”, presumably in the same
category as tobacco products or alcohol beverages”
[84]. While acknowledging a perceived risk from private
sector engagement in some cases, COI was widely
downplayed as manageable through disclosure and the
notion of excluding actors due to COI was dismissed as
“unfair” [64, 65].
Unintended consequences Respondents questioned
whether regulatory policies would have the intended
benefit for public health and argued that they may have
unintended negative effects. Food industry actors
claimed that regulatory policies would not work, either
because they are too narrowly focused (see ‘Complexity’)
or because, as seen particularly in the context of SSB
taxation, they would not have the desired effect of
decreasing consumption of the target product or nutrient
[74]. Conversely, the same respondents also warned
against devastating impacts of SSB taxation on businesses,
employment, the economy, or low-income groups. ICBA,
for example, justified its opposition to SSB taxation by
Lauber et al. Globalization and Health           (2020) 16:76 Page 8 of 15maintaining that “history has also shown that these types
of tax initiatives are regressive, and are unlikely to actually
affect obesity rates and thus non-communicable diseases”
[74]. Closely linked to the partnership framing discussed
above, food industry actors argued that the proposed COI
safeguards may undermine efforts to reduce NCDs by, for
example, depriving “member states of the knowledge, ex-
pertise, and resources of the private sector and put at risk
programs that are helping member states achieve their
own public health objectives” [64]. A number of respon-
dents, for example GMA and USCIB in two near-identical
submissions, explicitly presented non-engagement with
industry as a threat to NCD policy, arguing that “it is es-
sential that WHO support government engagement with
private sector, including by helping governments under-
stand missed opportunities and assess risk of not en-
gaging” [59, 63].Evidence A central element to commercial actors’ argu-
ments was evidence, including the principle of evidence-
based policymaking. Regulatory policies were contested
with claims that the evidence base is either insufficient
in quantity or quality, or contraindicative (closely linked
to ‘Unintended consequences’). Respondents questioned
the evidence base underlying regulation, BLL for
example asserted that “[a]dvertising plays – if it all – a
minor role in influencing food choices (…). This has
been shown in practice and scientific studies” [72] and
ICBA questioned the link between SSBs and obesity,
stating that “the overall weight of the scientific evidence
on sugar and/or sugar-sweetened beverages show that
they do not have a unique effect on body weight beyond
their contribution to total calorie intake” [74]. An appar-
ent lack of evidence was often put forward to justify
delaying policy action. IFBA, for example, claimed that
“further work is needed to assess the impact as well as
the implementation approaches of fiscal measures before
these are recommended” [79] and GMA argued that
“there are significant evidence gaps in understanding
how label format impacts consumer behaviour” [73].
The distinction between healthy and unhealthy foods
itself, and the use of associated terms such as proc-
essed and health-harming was contested with claims
that there is a lack of evidence supporting them.
Widely pledging their support for evidence-based
policymaking in principle, food industry actors also
portrayed industry engagement as an important part
of it, arguing, for example, that “[p]rivate sector engage-
ment is, and has been, a key contributor to evidence-
based policymaking at the WHO” [86]. More specifically,
multiple submissions argued that evidence-based policy-
making demands the consideration and inclusion of all
evidence, including the industry’s own.Good governance The concept of good governance was
invoked throughout the consultation responses, using
the indeterminate but ubiquitous term to advocate a
very specific approach to decision-making – a significant
role for the private sector and emphasis on minimising
the economic impact of health policies. Despite
rhetorical alignment with accountable and transparent
policymaking, respondents framed COI safeguards as
incoherent with, or even “antithetical” [64] to, good
governance. A number of US-based BAs explicitly made
reference to “good regulatory practice”, which, according
to USCIB, includes “transparent stakeholder consult-
ation, cost/benefit analysis, and assessment of alterna-
tives to regulation” [89]. Such arguments were closely
tied to the promotion of economic impact assessment.
Furthermore, policy coherence, within the WHO and
with the wider UN system, was emphasised by respon-
dents in support of their positions and preferred govern-
ance approaches. The SDGs as well as the WHO’s own
FENSA and publications on NCD policy were invoked
to oppose COI safeguards in nutrition policy. FIA, for
example, expressed its concern that the proposed safe-
guards “perhaps contradict the spirit of FENSA, as well
as the WHO’s Global Strategy for the prevention and
control of non-communicable diseases 2013-2020, the
2011 UN Political Declaration on NCDS, and the UN’s
Sustainable Development Goals, specifically SDG 17”
[66]. Correspondingly, industry engagement was
positioned as essential for increasing policy coherence.
The concept, often invoked with the aim of improving
the alignment of other policy agendas with health, was
reframed by Engaging America’s Global Leadership
(EAGL) [90] as going “in both directions”, meaning that
health ministries should also align their approaches with
other policy areas such as “economic growth and devel-
opment” [90].
Limited WHO mandate Submissions questioned the
political legitimacy of the WHO regarding its role within
the UN system, its internal coherence, and issues of na-
tional sovereignty. Closely related to arguments around
policy coherence mentioned above but instead conveying
a sense of the WHO’s NCD agenda being subordinate to
the wider UN’s Sustainable Development Agenda, the
WHO’s restricted room for action was highlighted. The
WHO Department of Nutrition’s attempts at developing
guidance for addressing and managing COI in nutrition
policy were framed as out of step with other WHO
policies, the SDGs and the overall multistakeholder
approach prominent within the UN system. Citing SDG
17 directly in several cases, respondents interpreted the
Sustainable Development agenda as an imperative for
partnership, suggesting that the WHO must comply with
this approach. Similarly, the WHO was portrayed as an
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its expertise and authority on issues such as fiscal policy
was questioned by actors opposing SSB taxation: “Offer-
ing such policy advice in a field – economics and fiscal
policy – far from WHO’s expertise is not in our opinion
a prudent course of action” [71, 91].
Respondents also emphasised national primacy in
decision-making, arguing that questions such as whether
to engage with industry in policymaking should not be
answered by the WHO, but left to Member States.
Correspondingly, and despite their non-binding nature,
proposed COI safeguards were portrayed as potentially
infringing on national sovereignty, and contravening
Member States’ legal obligations: “Member States must
observe their own legal and normative obligations to free
and open governance to deliver regulations that meet
public policy objectives” [92]. The US-based ICBA [93]
and GMA [94] explicitly referred to protections for com-
mercial speech as the potentially conflicting policy area.
Furthermore, the primary responsibility and authority
for tackling NCDs was attributed to national govern-
ments, implying that the WHO has a limited role to
play. Emphasising that NCD policy should be driven by
national priorities, respondents advocated flexible and
non-restrictive, namely weaker, recommendations.
Discussion
This study offers new insights into the ways in which
food industry actors engage with WHO consultations.
Firstly, it shows that this formal type of engagement
takes place though BAs at this level, the vast majority of
which represent the largest ultra-processed food manu-
facturers. Identical sections in submissions from differ-
ent BAs indicate a degree of coordination even though
these industry actors are competitors in their respective
markets. Secondly, our research confirms existing
evidence that food industry actors support non-statutory
measures and largely oppose further statutory regulation.
In terms of preferred governance approaches, respon-
dents strongly backed a multistakeholder approach and,
while acknowledging that COI needs to be managed, op-
posed the safeguards proposed by the WHO’s Nutrition
department [54]. Third, we explored how industry actors
framed the issue at hand to support their preferences. In
addition to using a range of arguments common in na-
tional public health policy contexts, they invoked a range
of malleable concepts, echoing language commonly used
by commercial actors globally to oppose regulation and
emphasise an ostensible need for the public sector to
engage with the private sector in policy development.
Previous research using framing as a lens to explore
food industry rhetoric in public health has focused
mostly on obesity as an issue [38, 95] or specific policies
such as SSB taxation [37, 96] and public-privateinitiatives [97]. Our research adds to this by exploring
and connecting a broad spectrum from specific NCD in-
terventions to questions around broader public health
governance. In the context of interventions, our findings
echo arguments which have been documented in the
context of country-level public health policy debates,
both by food companies and other unhealthy commodity
actors. We confirm existing research from the national
context which demonstrates that industry framing
portrays public health issues as individual or lifestyle
choices, and consequently interventions addressing indi-
vidual responsibility, such as education, as the solution
[13, 95, 98]. This framing also rules out policy solutions
which target the environment rather than the individual,
for example regulatory measures such as taxation and
advertising restrictions [95]. Principles such as market
justice, individual responsibility, and personal freedom
are common across industry framing in dietary public
health debates [95, 99] as well as other issues such as
tobacco [36, 100, 101] and alcohol [43, 102]. Despite
rhetorically aligning themselves with evidence-based pol-
icymaking, respondents overarchingly opposed regula-
tory in favour of non-regulatory policy options which
independent research suggests are less effective [103,
104]. Complexity framing of public health issues has also
been documented across unhealthy commodity industries
[105]. Similarly, calls for the enforcement of existing pol-
icies or voluntary measures as opposed to the introduction
of new policies are commonly observed across unhealthy
commodity industries [102, 106], with the term ‘regulatory
redundancy’ first introduced by tobacco control re-
searchers [107]. Due to tobacco companies’ role as invol-
untary outsiders to public health policymaking, being
likened to this industry appears to prompt heavy oppos-
ition in other commercial actors, a finding previously
noted in the context of the alcohol industry [102].
Narratives which question the WHO’s legitimacy link
into a broader discussion about its place within the UN
system. Food industry organisations challenged the
agency’s legitimacy and mandate, firstly by framing pro-
posed restrictions on industry engagement as incoherent
with good governance principles, the SDGs, and the
internationally dominant multistakeholder approach,
and secondly by questioning the WHO’s mandate on
NCD policy in the context of regulation. This closely
mirrors tobacco industry rhetoric in opposition to the
WHO’s FCTC [100], indicating that some arguments
may be consistent across unhealthy commodity indus-
tries on the global level. Moreover, arguments around
national sovereignty were employed to shift decision-
making away from the WHO where industry actors did
not agree with the policies proposed. Such attempts at
venue-shifting to other levels of governance where a pol-
icy may be easier to contest have been documented in
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dardised packaging [108]. Our analysis of submissions to
WHO consultations highlights how political strategies
constructed jurisdictional boundaries as a tactic to
curtail the WHO’s mandate in NCD governance. Future
research might draw on the theoretical framework of
multi-level governance [109] to explore how political
activities and messaging are coordinated globally, or to
explore the strategic role of business associations as
intermediaries between different levels of governance.
Food industry actors promoted their policy and
governance approaches preferences using a range of
what Smith calls ‘chameleonic ideas’ [110] which, vague
and flexible, may have different meanings depending on
how they are framed. Terms which are ubiquitous in the
global health policy space, such as good governance and
policy coherence, were invoked selectively by industry
actors to promote a very specific brand of policymaking.
For example, the malleable term ‘good governance’ was
employed in consultation responses to promote a
neoliberal view of policymaking, with a strong seat at the
table for industry and severely limited space for govern-
ment regulation. Similarly, the concept of policy coher-
ence, often invoked to promote the inclusion of health
in all policies, was used to suggest that, conversely,
health policies should be adapted to accommodate eco-
nomic concerns. Policy coherence was used selectively
to support preferred governance approaches and oppose
COI safeguards based on discrepancies with UN guide-
lines which encourage private sector engagement, but
respondents were silent on policies which do the
opposite, such as Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC which
excludes the tobacco industry from public health policy-
making. While invoking the idea of complexity to push
back against ostensibly simplistic regulatory measures
that target one ingredient or type of product, food in-
dustry actors simultaneously conveyed a simplistic view
of obesity and related NCDs which is deeply rooted in
the notion of individual responsibility. In so doing, they
failed to acknowledge its genuinely complex causes [111]
and the need for comprehensive measures to address it.
Though no companies participated directly, the largest
ultra-processed food producers were represented by the
vast majority of the BAs which responded to the WHO’s
consultations on NCD policy and governance. While it
is not known how much input member companies had
into the content of the submissions we analysed, we
demonstrate that Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, Nestlé, and
Mondelez were all represented multiple times in every
consultation we examined. BAs generally appear to play
a key role in coordinating food industry and wider com-
mercial engagement at the global level, which could be
partially explained by the fact that the WHO Executive
Board may grant international BAs, but not individualcorporations, Official Relations status [112]. Some of the
BAs in our sample publicise an explicit focus on provid-
ing access to international institutions: USCIB, for ex-
ample, claims on its website that “[n]o other American
organization can provide comparable channels for
business to interface with key inter-governmental bodies
such as the United Nations” [113]. Similarly, IFBA,
which responded to every single consultation covered in
this study, was set up by CEOs of the major inter-
national food and beverage corporations in response to
the 2004 Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and
Health, specifically to engage with WHO and other
multilateral institutions [114]. Indeed, the prevalence of
BAs in the global policy space also raises a potential
tension with the WHO’s policy of non-engagement with
the tobacco industry: even though some tobacco-linked
entities were excluded from WHO consultations (e.g.
the Philip Morris-funded Foundation for a Smoke-Free
World) [115], a lack of transparent reporting nonetheless
enabled business associations representing tobacco com-
panies to participate (e.g. USCIB [116] and BLL [117]).
Our research echoes concerns by academics and
advocates that the multistakeholder imperative within
the UN system is being employed to sustain corpor-
ate access to public health policymaking [33, 34].
Specifically, SDG 17, which calls for multistakeholder
partnerships, can be interpreted as a blanket appeal
to collaborate with the private sector. As such, an
open door for commercial actors (bar the exception
of tobacco and arms) and the idea that societal com-
plexity requires public-private collaboration not only
appears to facilitate opposition to safeguards against
undue influence in public health policy, it also im-
plies a stronger role for industry self-regulation. With
experts increasingly calling for population-level, regu-
latory interventions to tackle NCDs in the face of a
global lack of progress [19, 118], industry framing of
the issue promotes alternatives to regulation which
may weaken such attempts at governing the commer-
cial determinants of health. In contributing to our
understanding of industry framing around preferred
policies and governance approaches, our findings
support non-industry actors involved in global-level
policy debates to strengthen strategies to prevent in-
dustry interference, and to debunk or counter the
identified arguments from a public health perspec-
tive. One area to explore is strategic counter-framing,
for example by responding to arguments based on
the corporate right to participate in global health
governance with counter-framing rooted in the hu-
man right to health [119].
Our research has a number of limitations which
must be acknowledged. Publicly available consultation
responses, though easily accessible, grant only limited
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covers rhetoric used to try and influence policy and
participation in consultations, further research should
complement this by exploring the action-based influ-
encing strategies used to disseminate and legitimate
this narrative. Examples of other ways commercial
actors may exert influence include the participation of
food industry actors in WHO meetings, such as
IFBA’s presence at the UN High-Level Meetings on
NCDs [120, 121]. Though we focused solely on orga-
nisations overtly representing the food industry, it
remains an important task for future research to
explore arguments and activities of groups which are
linked to the industry, for example financially or
through interlocking directorates [122]. Building on
our study which captures the overt industry narrative,
establishing similarities and differences between the
way linked groups frame the issue is a crucial next
step. Lastly, while this is not something we attempted
to do in this study, we support recent calls for more
research on the impact of corporate political behav-
iour [123].
Conclusions
In summary, our findings reveal how multistakeholder
governance approaches in the wider UN system may be
exploited by corporations attempting to maintain and
expand their legitimacy in the NCD policy space, while
constraining that of the WHO. Amid the tensions
between the UN system’s efforts to democratise global
health governance and the pro-industry norms under-
lying multistakeholder governance, a door has opened
for commercial actors. Actors whose vast resources give
them greater access than civil society enjoys to a space
where their interests directly conflict with the public
good. The SDGs, by embracing multistakeholder col-
laboration as the way forward, set a status quo which
may undermine attempts to regulate the commercial
determinants of health [124, 125]. Policymakers and
institutions aiming to tackle NCDs globally are faced
with important decisions on who they consult and
collaborate with. Amidst a changing dynamic between
the governed and the governing, the food industry is not
only a vocal advocate for a prominent role of corpora-
tions in global health, but also a critic of the WHO as a
leading force in NCD policymaking. Such attempts to
undermine the agency’s position during ongoing re-
forms should be noted with concern. Lastly, current
governance approaches do not appropriately address
similarities in behaviour and rhetoric between un-
healthy commodities industries, with tobacco excluded
and others welcomed to the table. Considering the lack
of progress under the existing multistakeholder para-
digm, it may be time for a rethink.Supplementary information
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